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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In its statement of the Standard of Appellate Review, the Bar has correctly recited
the burden that Petitioners must meet in seeking a reversal of their assigned failing scores
on the July 2000 Utah State Bar Examination (the "Exam"): Petitioners must show that
they failed the examination because of a substantial irregularity in the administration of
the examination which resulted in manifest unfairness or because of mathematical
inaccuracy in the scoring process.
Petitioners do not dispute that they carry the burden of establishing irregularity or
inaccuracy with respect to the Exam, but this statement of Petitioners' burden of proof
does not address the appropriate standard of appellate review. According to this Court's
opinion in the case of In re Thome, 635 P.2d 22 (Utah 1981), the Court, in reviewing the
conduct of the Executive Committee of the Utah State Bar, may indulge some deference
to its findings. However, it is not bound to do so and in appropriate circumstances, may
"exercise its judgment independent of that of the Bar Commission." Id. at 23. This case
presents the very type of circumstances that demand the exercise of this Court's
independent judgment.
QUESTIONS OF MOOTNESS
In its Statement of the Case, the Bar argues that the claims of Petitioner Arnovick
ought to be considered moot because she chose to sit for the February 2001 Utah Bar
Examination and was determined to have passed the same. This argument fails to take
into account that Petitioner Amovick was denied licensure and the opportunity to practice
1

law by the Bar for the period from October 2000 until May 2001. Moreover, she was
compelled to expend time and resources in preparing for and retaking the Examination.
That she was finally granted licensure after that ordeal merely underscores both her
earlier entitlement to licensure (had the July 2000 Examination accorded her Due Process
and Equal Protection) and the injury in fact which accompanied its delay.
"...a person is not required by any state to repeatedly demonstrate his competence
to practice law. The rule is: once is enough. And the reason for the rule is that it takes
work, effort and, nowadays, money to prepare for a bar examination. Moreover, the
license is deemed of sufficient value that delay in getting it is an injury." Richardson v.
McFadden. 540 F.2d 744, 752 (4th Cir. 1976).
Contrary to the assertion of the Respondent, not only are Petitioner Arnovick's
claims not moot, she is, at a minimum, entitled to injunctive relief as to a deemed
effective date of licensure.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Bar's analysis and argument in this case are predicated upon a
misapprehension of the law in at least four critical areas.
1.

The Bar is an administrative agency bound by its own rules.

The Bar suggests that it is not, for all purposes and intents, an administrative
agency. The apparent rationale for this assertion is that if the Bar is not an administrative
agency it may somehow be excused for knowing, intentional and deliberate violations of
the rules it promulgated for its own governance.
The Utah Constitution grants exclusive power to this Court to "govern the practice
of law, including admissions to practice law." Utah Const. Art. VHL § 4. This Court,
2

through Rules for Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar, has delegated some
of those duties and responsibilities, including the promulgation of governing rules, to the
Bar. "When the Bar acts to enforce these rules it is acting as an arm of the Supreme
Court. Pendleton v. Utah State Bar. 16 P.3d 1230 (Utah 2000).
Respondent relies upon the case of Barnard v. Utah State Bar. 804 P.2d 526 (Utah
1991), for the proposition that the Bar is not an administrative agency. However, the
holding of the Barnard case was very limited in scope: the Utah State Bar is not a state
agency within the meaning of the Archives and Records Services and Information
Practices Act and Public and Private Writings Act. Of course, it is well-settled that an
administrative agency must strictly abide by the letter of the rules that it has promulgated.
Vitarelli v. Seaton. 359 U.S. 535, 539-540 (1959).
However, even if the Bar is not acting as an administrative agency in connection
with the construction, administration and grading of the Bar Exam, the various choices it
made in ignoring its own rules constitute arbitrary and capricious conduct. The Bar takes
the position that its own rules, as applied to the Bar itself, are advisory only.
By way of example, but nor limitation, the Bar asserts die following: it is
acceptable to have an essay exam composed of only 11 questions; it doesn't really matter
whether each essay question is worth something less than 5 points; the qualifications
required for drafters and graders are not important and need not be enforced. On the
other hand, the Bar argues that because there is no specific rule requiring it to provide
discovery requested by the Petitioners, it can pick and choose what information will be
3

accessible. In effect, the Bar contends that it may decide arbitrarily what rules will be
enforced and which rules will be ignored. This is the very definition of "arbitrary and
capricious" conduct for purposes of Constitutional analysis.
The Bar has conceded that at least one violation of its rules constitutes a
"substantial irregularity" in the July 2000 examination process. See. Respondent's Brief
at p. 18. However, it attempts to excuse that conduct by asserting its putative good faith.
This assertion fails to recognize that the purpose of the rules governing the Respondent's
conduct and the mandate that those rules be followed to the letter is for the very purpose
of preventing arbitrary and capricious conduct. Lack of a requirement of strict adherence
to the letter of such rules is tantamount to having no Rules at all. It is also the sine qua
non of arbitrariness and capriciousness.
2.

Retaking the Exam is not a remedy but an injury.

The Bar repeatedly asserts that if there be some merit to the claims of the
Petitioners their remedy is to again sit for the Utah Bar Examination. This contention
fundamentally misstates the law. While there is a split of authority among other
jurisdictions, the issue is not one of first impression for this Court. Where fundamental
weaknesses or flaws in the examination process are evident, the remedy is to accord
licensure rather than to insist that aggrieved applicants retake the examination. In effect,
retaking the examination in the face of the Respondent's errors is not a remedy in Utah.
In re Petition of John Randolph-Seng. 669 P.2d 400 (Utah 1983). In fact, it is an injury.
Richardson v. McFadden. 540 F.2d 744, 752 (4th Cir. 1976).
4

3.

The Bar is legally bound to disclose relevant and material
information necessary to a fair proceeding.

The Respondent suggests that its refusal to provide discovery to the Petitioners of
information which is vital to the proof of certain of their allegations and which
information is solely and exclusively within the Respondent's control, is both
insubstantial and permissible. In a situation analogous to that presented here, the Fifth
Circuit determined it was impermissible to allow the erection of a barrier around those
concealing relevant information necessary to fair litigation. Indeed, the Court expressly
disapproved of the Bar's position that its bald denial of improper conduct should sustain
its refusal to provide discovery. Parrish v. Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State
Bar. 533 F. 2d 942, 947 (5th Cir. 1976).
The Court of Appeal of California has addressed the identical issue in the case of
Sewell v. Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California. 154 Cal.App.3d
256; 201 Cal.Rptr. 140 (1984). The petitioner in Sewell was seeking to discover
evidence regarding the scoring of his examination in coimection with his challenge to the
Bar Examiners' determination that he had not successfully passed the California bar
examination. The examiners provided very limited information to the petitioner and
refused the remaining requests.
The Court reasoned that since the petitioner was seeking documentary evidence,
an analogy should be made to the California Code of Civil Procedure. Under those rules,
(as in Utah), documents are discoverable if they are "relevant to the subject matter of the
5

action, or are reasonably calculated to discover admissible evidence." The court then
held that even though the petitioner had not proceeded under the Code of Civil
Procedure, the provisions of those rules should be available to him. Sewell v. Committee
of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California. 201 Cal.Rptr at 142. The Court was
persuaded by the fact that the petitioner was saddled with the burden of establishing the
examiners' impropriety before the Supreme Court and stated:
In order to have the opportunity to meet this burden, an unsuccessful
applicant should have relatively unrestrained access to relevant evidence.
(Application of Peterson (Alaska 1969) 459 P.2d 703, 711). Id. at 142.
4.

The Petitioners' right to practice law is a substantial interest
protected by Due Process and Equal Protection guaranties.

The Respondent incorrectly dismisses the Matthews test as inapplicable to the case
at bar. Matthews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976),
establishes the three-tier test for determining to what extent a particular judicial or
administrative procedure affords Due Process. The three competing interests in such a
situation must be weighed and balanced against each other. First, the private interest
being affected, in this case, the right to practice law, has been determined to be a
fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution. In re July 1986 Ohio Bar
Examination Applicant No. 719. 574 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1991), citing Supreme Court of
New Hampshire v. Piper. 470 U.S. 274, 281, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 1277, 84 L.Ed.2d 205, 211
(1985). An applicant's risk of being erroneously deprived of this right must then be
weighed against alternate or additional measures that could be implemented and the
6

governmental interest in minimizing monetary and administrative burdens that may occur
with alternate or additional measures.
Here, the Bar has attempted to downplay the Petitioners' rights with respect to the
practice of law as compared to a welfare recipient or a disability benefits recipient.
However, the correct comparison is among the right to practice law and the available
alternate measures that could have been utilized by the Bar to reduce or eliminate the
prospect of an erroneous outcome and the potential cost of the alternatives. The Bar has
failed to articulate any reason why it could not implement some or all of the alternatives
suggested by Petitioners and, in fact, utilized by other states. Under the Matthews
analysis, the Bar's conduct is arbitrary and capricious.
B.

The Bar's analysis and argument are further predicated upon a
misapprehension of the facts or a misunderstanding of Petitioners9
arguments.
1.

It is impossible to determine who did or did not pass the Exam.

The Bar fundamentally mischaracterizes one of the Petitioners' argument as
follows: if the July 2000 Examination been properly constructed, administered and
scored, the Petitioners would have been determined to have passed. In fact, the
Petitioners' argument is simply that the Bar cannot determine who did or did not pass an
examination so fundamentally and fatally constructed, administered and graded. To use
such an examination to determine qualification for licensure fails to comport with the
requirements of Due Process. To award licenses to some, but not all applicants who
7

endured such an examination violates the mandates of Equal Protection.
2.

The Exam was subjecting to "curving" or "norming" thereby
making the Exam a test for something other than competency.

The Bar insists that the grades upon the July 2000 Examination were not subject to
"curving" or "norming" as asserted by the Petitioners and established by their expert. In
its Brief, the Bar focuses on the Ethics Grading Committee's tally sheet, explaining that
the "curving" information set forth therein was created after the completion of the
grading process and as a result, there was no "bell curve" utilized in the grading process.
The time at which this tally sheet was created is irrelevant and the Bar's reliance on the
tally sheet misses the point.
The Bar's grading regimen, as applied to each essay question, is totally
meaningless absent reference to the test-taking group as a whole. The Bar's Grading
Handbook (Section V.F.) and its Rules (Rule 7-4) both provide for the assignment of
grades by reference to the performance of the group as a whole. As explained by
Petitioners' expert, the curving process, or "norm referenced" testing, assumes that a
certain percentage of applicants will fail. In adopting this system, the Bar disregarded the
"criterion referenced" grading system recommended by the National Conference of Bar
Examiners. See. Grading Handbook Section IV. "Criterion referenced" testing is based
upon a minimum competency benchmark that must be met by each candidate. Under the
"criterion referenced" method, there may be wide fluctuations in the pass rate from year
to year, but the competency standard remains constant.
8

In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Respondent points to the uniformity of its
passing rates from examination to examination as evidence of its fairness in the construct,
administration and grading of each examination and in particular, of the July 2000
Examination. In fact such uniformity merely evidences that the Bar does indeed "curve'*
or "norm" grades, it having, by its own admission, chosen regularly to ration licenses to
not more than approximately 87.85 percent of those who seek them. It also lets one know,
in advance of any future examination, the expected percentage and therefore, the number
of future applicants the Bar will be willing to admit to practice, regardless of individual
levels of competence or incompetence.
Those courts which have considered cases involving curving of scores have
uniformly disapproved of the practice and have done so stridently. In re Dennis T.
ReardoiL 378 A.2d 614 (Del. 1977); Richardson v. McFaddeiL 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir.
1976). This Court should do no less.
3.

A "rational" solution to a problem created by prior arbitrary and
capricious conduct does not remedy the discriminatory
consequences of that conduct

The Bar suggests that if the defects in its Examination constituted "substantial
irregularities," those irregularities did not result in manifest unfairness to the Petitioners
in that all applicants had to suffer through the same examination. This assertion begs the
question of whether or not the Bar has the primary duty to examine Bar applicants in
accordance with its own Rules, if not also in a manner consistent with Due Process.
9

The Bar makes much of its "acceptable and least problematic" response (deleting
the Torts question from the Exam) to "the real world problem" of a "defective question."
See. Brief of Respondent at p. 19. The Bar states that "[I]t was during the initial
calibration grading process that the graders discovered that the torts question was not
fairly assessing the knowledge of the applicants." See. Brief of Respondent at p. 18.
However, determining the validity of a particular question does not fall within the
province of the grading committee. It is clear that the Grading Committee is not invested
with the power to review a question for validity, nor to make a decision that the question
was defective, with or without input from the National Conference of Bar Examiners, the
Admission Administrator or the Bar's General Counsel. See. Grading Handbook, Section
V. The Grading Committee is authorized:
1.

To arrive at a consensus analysis of the question.

2.

To calibrate to consistent grading standards.

3.

To grade the examination books.

There is a very detailed and specific procedure to be followed by the Bar
Examiners Committee and the Bar Examiner Review Committee, well in advance of the
administration of the Exam, to insure that the questions included on the essay portion of
the Exam are fairly assessing the knowledge of the applicants. See. Grading Handbook,
Section III. Because Petitioners have been denied their discovery requests, they have no
way of knowing whether the requisite procedures were followed. Apparently some part
of that process was omitted or performed improperly because the Bar has conceded that
10

the question was defective. The Bar suggests that a "rational" proposal to delete the torts
question, made after the fact, should somehow absolve the Bar from the consequences of
its arbitrary and capricious conduct. This is not the appropriate legal standard to be
applied in this or any other case.
C.

The Bar tacitly concedes, through its lack of a response, the merits of
many of the Petitioners9 arguments.

The Respondent refers to the Petitioners' Brief as evidencing a "shotgun approach"
to establishing impropriety in the actions of the Bar. In fact, there are simply a plethora of
fatal flaws in the construct, administration and grading of the July 2000 Bar Examination.
The more appropriate analogy would be to that of the Respondent as having too few
"fingers with which to plug holes in the dike", any one of which, if left unattended, is
sufficient to spell disaster.
Moreover, instead of directly challenging each allegation upon its merits, the
Respondent has selectively responded only to those for which it can muster some form of
counter argument and as to the rest, it has discharged a "blunderbust" of marginalization
through ridicule. While this "talk-radio approach" to argument may be an entertaining
way in which to deal with points too prickly to address upon their merits, that protocol
ill-serves the Respondent in this context. It cannot too often be reiterated that the
Petitioners need not prevail upon each and every allegation of prejudicial error in order to
prevail in their case-in-chief (though they earnestly believe they should). They need only
prevail upon one. At the same time, the Respondent must refute each and all of the
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Petitioners1 allegations, establishing in that process that it accorded the Petitioners Due
Process and Equal Protection in all respects, else its defense must fail.
At the close of the hearing on January 8, 2001, Counsel for the Petitioners sought
to have the record held open for receipt of a psychometric report to deal with various
issues presented. See, Grievants' Letter with Request to Submit Psychometrician Expert
Report (Tab P). The Respondent, while agreeing to receive the Petitioners' psychometric
report, elected to render a decision in the Petitioners' cases without benefit of this report
and without obtaining one of its own. Subsequently, and as a part of their Opening Brief
the Petitioners submitted a psychometric report documenting various fatal deficiencies
with respect to the July 2000 Examination.
There is no record evidence of any consultation by the Bar with any competent
source, much less any documentation which challenges the expert opinion of Mr.
Gustafson that: the grades assigned to July 2000 Bar applicants were "normed;" that the
grading formula changed once the defective Torts question was deleted; that the
remaining eleven questions were impermissibly overweighted upon deletion of the
defective Torts question; that there was insufficient time available within which to fairly
and consistently grade all essay questions, and that the standard deviation formula to be
applied to the grading of all applicants changed once the Examinations of those
applicants originally deemed to have failed the Examination were reappraised.
In this case, the Bar has failed to respond to the merits of Petitioners' allegations of
fatal denials of Due Process and Equal Protection in the following respects:
12

1.

The July 2000 Bar Examination was subjected to grade compression

(curving) or "norming" which rendered it a test for something other than minimal
competence of the law. As such, the Examination ceased to have a rational relationship to
the determination of applicants' fitness or capacity to engage in the practice of law and its
use to determine the award of licensure was arbitrary and capricious.
2.

The deletion of the Torts question from the July 2000 Examination

fundamentally changed the character of that Examination by compelling an impermissible
overweighting of those questions remaining.
3.

The standard deviation formula utilized to assign grades to applicants was

fundamentally altered when the grades of five applicants were reassessed.
4.

Insufficient time was allotted by which the process of grading could be

accomplished in other than an inconsistent, arbitrary and capricious manner.
5.

Not all of those who composed and scored the July 2000 Examination

possessed the requisite qualifications to do so.
6.

The anonymity of those who sat for the July 2000 Examination was not

preserved from disclosure.
7.

Essay questions were not graded within the required confines of the 0 to 5

standard set forth in the Grading Handbook.
D.

The Bar indicts its membership in order to justify its refusal to provide
necessary discovery.

Perhaps most troubling of all of the assertions, contentions and positions made or
13

taken by the Respondent in this matter is that regarding disclosure of the identity and
qualification of those it employed to design, administer and grade the July 2000 Bar
Examination. As the Court is aware, the Respondent has repeatedly refused Petitioners'
discovery requests.
In defense of its refusal to comply with the discovery requests of the Petitioners,
the Respondent has suggested a rationale which more than strains credulity. To suggest
that it is or would be difficult to find Bar members willing to serve the public through
assisting with the construction, administration and grading of Bar examinations indicts,
hopefully unfairly, their professionalism. To suggest that any or all of them would flinch
if called upon to defend their roles in that endeavor challenges their character and
integrity. To refuse to disclose even the identity or qualifications of those called upon to
participate in the examination process once again raises substantial questions about the
legitimacy of the Respondent's own intent, as well as its conduct. See. Petitioners'
Opening Brief at p. 14, footnote 1.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent, throughout its Brief; chafes at the thought that it must abide by
Rules it has promulgated to prevent arbitrary and capricious misconduct. It musters all of
its resources to urge that whatever Due Process and Equal Protection must be wrenched
from its fingers and accorded the Petitioners be as minimal as allowable, a curious
position for those trained in the law and putatively in step with its spirit. The Bar
confesses irregularities, but avoids an honest appraisal of their consequences, not only for
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the Petitioners, but for the manner in which it must henceforth conduct its affairs. And
finally, it looks to this Court to uphold its actions and to grant absolution, either because
it believes that this Court hungers to do so, regardless of merit or that it lacks the
fortitude to do otherwise.
The primary concern of this Court is not the possibility that applicants putatively
unqualified may be admitted under exceptional circumstances in order to prevent patent
injustice, but instead that weaknesses or flaws in the administration of a bar examination
not exclude such persons in contravention of due process and equal protection
considerations. In re Petition of John Randolph-Seng. 669 P.2d 400, 401 (Utah 1983).
Where such weaknesses or flaws are evident, the remedy is to accord licensure, rather
than to insist that aggrieved applicants retake the examination. Id. at 402; Richardson v.
McFadden. 540 F. 2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976). In effect, the charge of the Utah Supreme Court
in its review of this matter is not, as the Respondent would assert, merely vigorously to
scrutinize the claims of the Petitioners. Rather, and as this Court has stated, that charge is
primarily to assure fundamental fairness to the Petitioners, else grant them licensure.
The relief the Petitioners seek is indeed, extraordinary. The substantial
irregularities in the construction, administration and grading of the Examination which,
individually and in combination, manifestly and unjustly accorded the Petitioners
treatment disparate from others who sat for that Examination, compel no less. To grant
Due Process and Equal Protection has never been easy for any judicial body. Although
there would only be three individuals who would qualify for the relief requested herein,
15

the granting of that relief will still be noteworthy. Such is the case with momentous
constitutional decisions. The question becomes whether the decision this Court must
enter and explicate is to be remembered and cited, as it most certainly will be, as the
modern day equivalent to Gideon v. Wainwright or, as the Respondent's position would
dictate, another Dred Scott decision.
DATED this

of September, 2001.

Carolyn Montgomery
Attorney for Petitioners
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the /^"ctay of September, 2001,1 served two
copies of the attached REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS upon Katherine A. Fox,
counsel for the Utah State Bar, by personally hand delivering it to her at the following
address:
Katherine A. Fox
General Counsel
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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